Note: This article was conceptualised before Bayern Munich’s sensational 9-2 victory over Dinamo Zagreb. The tactical ideas presented here were already concrete in the author’s mind prior to the game, but there may be a minor subconscious influence on the writing after the game.
I’d always wondered why the Gideons provide a Bible in hotels…
Bayern Munich under Vincent Kompany have shown a proclivity for tactical changes every game, with Kompany making adjustments to the structure in every game — particularly in the early phases of build-up — to account for the opposition’s shape. However, it remains to be seen if this approach will work against teams later in the season when they are more settled into their general systems and will begin to strategise more specifically against Kompany’s own tendencies.
Until I realised the loneliness of life’s a business in itself.
A consistent structure is crucial to having success over the course of an entire season, and while it’s unlikely or even possible that Kompany will use such a system, it’s still a good thought exercise to construct a system that could viably be used.
So you sing your drunken hymns, you let it out to let it in.
Do you feel God, or just the air from the machine? Splitting the personnel into their position groups
Photo by Christina Pahnke – sampics/Getty Images
The television is watching me.
The positional groups are quite simple. By dividing the squad into specific roles, we have consistent structures and the ability to immediately replace an unavailable player seamlessly. Due to the versatility in the squad, if a position is underloaded, there are always several players who can inhabit that role too.
() = indicates player is not planned for this position primarily but can fill in if required
Goalkeepers – Manuel Neuer, Daniel Peretz, Sven Ulreich
Centre-backs – Dayot Upamecano, Min-jae Kim, Konrad Laimer, Josip Stanišić, (Leon Goretzka)
Right-backs – Joshua Kimmich, Sacha Boey, (Dayot Upamecano)
Left-backs – Hiroki Itō, Leon Goretzka, (Raphaël Guerreiro)
Midfielders (left) – João Palhinha, Aleksandar Pavlović, (Joshua Kimmich)
Midfielders (right) – Jamal Musiala, Raphaël Guerreiro, (Konrad Laimer)
Right wingers – Michael Olise, Leroy Sané, (Sacha Boey)
Left wingers – Kingsley Coman, Alphonso Davies, (Mathys Tel)
Attacking midfielders – Thomas Müller, Serge Gnabry, (Jamal Musiala)
Strikers – Harry Kane, Mathys Tel, (Serge Gnabry)
Bury her light ‘til it all goes black: The out-of-possession shape
Photo by Sebastian Widmann/Getty Images
And if it never comes, just keep dancing to the drum.
I know that positional breakdown will raise a lot of eyebrows, but trust me it will make a lot more sense (or sound even more hair-brained) once you understand the structure. We begin with the out-of-possession shape, more specifically the pressing plans.
This first shape is what the team inhabits against opposition that like to build-up with a 2-3 structure, which is to say, two outfield players as the first line with a line of three just ahead of them (in this case, two centre-backs, a single midfielder dropped deep and the full-backs).
When the goalkeeper has the ball, the team will hold a man-to-man press in midfield and defense to prevent a long ball. In this case, the opposition’s right-sided midfielder is advanced, meaning Kim will step up to mark him while Palhinha joins the first line of pressure. If this were to happen on the other side, Upamecano and Musiala would step up instead. With Kane (or Müller if the sides were mirrored) marking the pivot, the goalkeeper’s only safe option is to play it to the centre-backs. This is when the second part of the press is triggered, where Palhinha (or Musiala, you get the drill by now) presses the centre-back while, very importantly, curving their run a little inwards, and we also see movement in the middle with Kane moving from the pivot player to the keeper while Müller shifts to the pivot player. This closes down the option for the centre-back to pass it to their midfielder on the off chance the midfielder has lost his marker, makes recycling by using the goalkeeper or pivot impossible, and essentially forces the centre-back into playing it to their full-back or attempting to dribble (yeah, good luck against Palhinha).
Once the ball is played to the full-back, the final stage of the high press is triggered, where Coman immediately engages the player on the ball, while Palhinha stays where he is to cut off the return pass. Every single player in passing range is marked, meaning the full-back has no option but to dribble it out or somehow find the players on the opposite side of the pitch by looping it over the entire team — something that still requires getting past Olise and Kimmich who are not tied down to a man and are free to intercept the pass without breaking structure. This is, in my opinion, the best way for this team to set up against this shape both for the personnel and for the kind of transitions I want the team to undertake when the ball is won.
If the opposition utilise a line of three with a double pivot ahead of them, the team will once again line up man-to-man, this time with Musiala marking the double pivot, the wingers pushed up onto the wide defenders and everyone else marked man-for-man, the exception being Müller who will be a couple steps off the central defender, making him the most viable option. If the goalkeeper plays it to the wide defender, they have no choice but to pass it back as all the other options are covered and they have a winger pressing them. Once the central defender gets the ball, Müller’s press is triggered, forcing the ball back to the goalkeeper. However, teams adapt to this by pulling one of the pivot players into the deepest line. In this case, the left-sided pivot player drops between the defenders, and Musiala follows. The usual occurrence when this happens is a player from the attacking line drops into the space created by the pivot, but the defender marking said player — in case Upamecano — will follow, keeping it man-for-man. This will cause one of two things to happen, both of which are situations we have contingencies for.
The first situation is where the wingers to drop to try and stretch the Bayern press by creating more options in the defensive third, but we can disregard this as we are still going man-for-man, with Goretzka and Kimmich pushing up to keep them tied down.
The second situation is where one of the two central attackers drops, with Kim following. To prevent the player from being able to hold up the ball, Kane will loosen off his man and move a little more central to block the passing lane, and Coman will narrow in to make both the pass to the pivot and the wide defender very dangerous. In both situations, once this structure is achieved, Müller will press the keeper, and with the central defender in his cover shadow, the goalkeeper will be forced to play long. If the central defender drops to receive from the keeper again, they are in big trouble as now Coman can press the player on the ball with the wide receiver in his cover shadow, or Müller can continue his press with all the options to pass being blocked, and no way back as the defender is now essentially on his own byline.
No matter how you cut it, the opposition will require some serious individual skill or a lapse in judgement from Bayern to break into the Bayern block, achieved not through a low block or through a no-frills all-thrills high press but rather smartly moving the ball into a corner and then pouncing all at once.
The only boy racer left on the island: The structure in build-up
Photo by Alex Grimm/Getty Images
No man gets left behind.
Now things get really interesting. One may have noticed how one of the centre-backs is often very high up the field and not in line with the rest of the defense, and may wonder how the team transition from that to build-up without needing to perform rest passes — essentially passes that kill time until the team can get into their in-possession shape. Well actually, those positions are exactly where the centre-backs are meant to be on the ball too.
Against a three-man press, the centre-backs immediately both push up into midfield while Goretzka and Kimmich tuck in to form a faux back-three with Neuer. This of course will bring the pressers close together which would be a problem normally, but with Kim and Upamecano pushed up, there is a massive 5v3 overload in the centre of the pitch, one which the backline can quickly take advantage of to bypass the first line of the press. Again, this shape can be mirrored if the ball is on the other side, but I am using the left side with Goretzka as the example. The key to creating this central overload is by having Müller sat in awkward positions between the centre-backs where neither can really commit to marking him, meaning Müller ties down two of the defenders. If one of the defenders marks him, he can move into spaces in the dead-centre to create gaps in the half-spaces for other players to run into.
These are the two general ways that a team can react to this overload. The first is by pressing Goretzka quickly with two men and playing zonal in the middle to try and minimise the space, but with Kim not being marked specifically, this pass is open for Goretzka to make, and Kim can quickly lay it off to the left where Bayern have a 4v3 advantage, and can quickly break forward with Musiala, Upamecano and Olise all being accomplished ball-carriers and creative passers.
The second way a team may react is by pressing Goretzka and by marking both pivots. However, this frees up the left half-space with a 2v3 accessible through either a direct pass to Kane (if the defender stays deep to mark Müller) or a ball over the top to Müller (if the defender steps up to mark Kane), but even easier is utilising Olise and Musiala running 2v1 against the opposition full-back on the right, accessible through a switch-pass that has no players in the way. Once the ball is in these advanced areas, due to the overloads and the fast-moving players involved, it will be very difficult for the opposition to regain numerical parity or even an advantage.
If facing a 4-4-2, due to the flat nature of the lines, Palhinha will likely be free in these situations but will need to receive support quickly as he is surrounded on four sides by opposition players. Müller can drop into space but doing so would bring the defensive line up and bring the centre-backs closer to Kane and Musiala, which is not ideal. Instead, as the ball is being played, the defenders will shift into a back three, with Kimmich inverting into midfiedl to form a double pivot. This will immediately give Bayern a man advantage in the middle, and create situations like the one above where Palhinha has the opportunity to play Müller on the last line or play a through ball to a running Musiala. Kane and Musiala can stretch the pivot to create space for Kimmich and Palhinha to operate in by going wide, but can also narrow in to create space for Coman and Olise to make runs in the half-spaces, who will more likely than not out-pace the defender tracking them. Palhinha and especially Kimmich are both experienced carriers of the ball, so if the opposition decide to concede space to mark men, either player can carry the ball forward and now the defenders are in even deeper trouble.
An alternative shape in this system can see Goretzka in the middle with Kimmich, with Palhinha splitting the centre-backs, but while this shape is better for offense, it would require some out-of-possession roles to be swapped. Namely, in the event of turnovers, Kim and Upamecano will have to take on the roles of the full-backs in marking the wide forwards while Kimmich and Goretzka drop in the centre. This is unideal as Kim and Upamecano are much faster and stronger, being able to cover ground in the centre in the event of a long ball which Goretzka and Kimmich cannot do as effectively.
This is another system used by teams nowadays, where a two-man press is employed on both centre-backs with the pivot player being marked too. With Palhinha being marked, the ball can be played to the full-backs who aren’t tightly marked (if they were, Kane and Musiala can very easily drift wide and receive). Once the full-backs receive, Kim and Upamecano push up into midfield, and Neuer pushes up too to split Kimmich and Goretzka, and give Bayern a 3-man backline to retain a numerical advantage against the opposition. Kim and Upamecano in the centre once again gives us a 5v3 central overload, with the opposition wing-backs being forced to either mark Upamecano and Kim — which would leave Coman and Olise completely free — or mark Coman and Olise — which would retain Bayern’s central control. Either way, Bayern now have a major advantage and can advance the ball into the final third. It does not even require the central players to get on the ball, as if the opposition defenders go wide to mark the wingers instead of the wing-backs, there is space in the half-spaces for Kane and Musiala to both make runs, effectively creating a 3v1 with Kane, Musiala and Müller against the central defender, the double pivot trailing.
Any way you cut it, Bayern have either a clear path to progression or atleast retaining the ball. The versatility of this squad and the ability to play in fluid systems that they have demonstrated gives them the luxury to play such systems, however unlikely its actual implementation may be.
What did you think of this thought piece? Do you think there’s any weaknesses to be exploited? Let us know your thoughts in the discussion below.
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