Since the 1890s, the story of English rugby has been one of great underlying potential, limited by the long term consequences of a zealous and hardline commitment to amateurism. So often they’ve been a slumbering, bumbling giant, with their huge player numbers and financial wealth not reflected in their trophy cabinet.
Every so often though, the aromatic compounds created by the Malliard reaction in the roasting process reach the olfactory receptors of the catatonic behemoth. That’s right, eventually the giant smells the coffee and wakes up.
In this article we’ll look through history at both some of the ways that English rugby has tied one arm behind its own back and some of the times that it’s recognised this self inflicted predicament and done something about it. And we’ll see how September’s Professional Game Agreement and other recent initiatives could impact on Steve Borthwick’s men going forward. Should the rest of the world be worried?
RUGBY’S FIRST SUPERPOWER
In the first decade or two of international rugby, in the 1870s and 80s, before the inaugural Lions and intercolonial tours, Tests were exclusively Home Nations affairs. England had more clubs and players than their three opponents and right through into the first half of the 1890s the giant made its size count. It won the most championships and had a positive record against all the other countries. That didn’t last for long.
(Photo by Dan Mullan/Getty Images)
TOFFS V PRAGMATISTS: THE GREAT SCHISM
The idea that even elite athletes should play purely for the love of the sport was a pretty easy ideal for the posh, wealthy powerbrokers of the English game. Working class players couldn’t afford to give up wages to take time off for rugby, but they didn’t really count.
By the 1890s, the industrial North was the powerhouse of the English game. It had the most clubs, supplied most of the England team, and some of its top club fixtures attracted more spectators than England matches. But the strict amateur rules were causing some players financial problems and putting off potential recruits.
Trying to grow the game, two Yorkshire committee members proposed a compromise. They didn’t even want professionalism, just that “players be allowed compensation for bona fide loss of time.” Unfortunately, Southerners dominated the national committee, so this and other attempts were soundly defeated. #NorthernRugbyMatters.
The leading 22 Yorkshire and Lancashire clubs then left the RFU in 1895, robbing England of most of its tough, working class players. Those left behind tended to be more relaxed, not training as hard or sharing the same determination to win. So much so that in the 1900s England didn’t even bother to copy successful innovations from other countries like a specialist scrum half and fly half instead of left and right half backs.
Although England still had by far the most players, it took a full fifteen years for them to win another championship. The new superpower of Europe was Wales, where the game was popular in the mining and factory towns as well as the elite schools. Globally they were also overtaken by the rough and ready colonists of South Africa and New Zealand.
And so the giant snored. Zzzzzzzzzzzzzz.
TIME TO GET SERIOUS – HARLEQUINS WERE ENTERTAINERS BUT NOT JOKERS
A 1907 thrashing from Wales – who England hadn’t beaten since 1898 – finally got the giant’s dander up. It drove Rugby School and Oxford University alumnus Adrian Stoop to drag Harlequins’ play into the 20th century and he became England’s captain and first-ever fly half. That’s right, thanks to Stoop England finally started to employ specialists at scrum half and fly half, allowing the giant to effectively bring its full strength into the fight.
Wales were the opponents in the inaugural Twickenham Test in 1910 and Stoop sparked a brilliant backline try in minute one. England’s mighty little nemesis was finally vanquished and the mother country became truly dominant in Europe, winning three and sharing one of the five Five Nations tournaments held before the Great War. Stoop conquered with the attacking philosophy that Quins has been known for ever since.
Then when rugby resumed after the war it was another Harlequins innovator who revolutionised English loose forward play. The role had always been one of fairly static ball winning, but Wavell Wakefield was a fast athlete who also ran and passed with the backs. It was another three outright and one shared championship for England from the next five tournaments, although they couldn’t stop the Springbok or All Black juggernauts pre and post WWI.
THE GIANT SLOWLY DRIFTS OFF AGAIN
In the four decades or so after that golden era, England were the most successful team in the Home/Five Nations without ever truly dominating. During this period Wales had a better record against the antipodeans, while the other slumbering colossus, France, finally awoke in the 50s to become England’s equal in Europe and better in inter-hemisphere contests.
This level of performance seems to have been acceptable to the RFU, but in reality the eyelids were starting to droop again. After winning the title in 1963 there followed a period of over 20 years with just one championship. They were being outshone by Wales, France and Ireland, and this humiliation was enough to finally jolt the giant back into consciousness.
THE BURGESS REPORT
To diagnose their problems, the RFU asked its Playing subcommittee to produce a paper called “Proposed new playing structure to improve quality of play at representative level.” Swiftly dubbed the Burgess report after lead author John Burgess, it concluded that their domestic game simply wasn’t competitive enough. Whereas the other four nations had long-established national leagues or provincial championships, due to a commitment to amateurism there wasn’t enough real competition in the English domestic game. It was as if they’d actively sought not to succeed in international rugby .
They established a region-based Divisional Championship and a national club league. These improved standards domestically, as well as the cohesion of the national team, where even new recruits had regional teammates they were used to playing with. Meanwhile, the brash leadership of England manager Geoff Cooke and skipper Will Carling fought the “old farts” on behalf of the Test players and drove improved fitness & systems within the team.
Jonny Wilkinson kicks the drop-goal which won the 2003 World Cup. (David Davies / PA via AP, FILE)
England won seven titles in 14 years from 1991, three matches against the All Blacks, five in a row versus Australia and seven in a row over the Springboks. And there was the small matter of winning Old Bill himself in 2003, with final appearances in 1991 and 2007.
A HEAD IN THE SAND APPROACH TO PROFESSIONALISM
All seemed rosy, but the RFU’s amateur ideals had already led to another poor strategic decision with severe long term repercussions. In 1995, when the move to professionalism became inevitable, the RFU couldn’t bring itself to take control of the situation, abdicating authority to the clubs. The regional comp was abandoned and the clubs left to their own devices.
The loss of the Divisional Championship reduced cohesion, while the dominance of the clubs destroyed the alignment of the national game. This didn’t matter so much while Martin Johnson’s golden generation was playing, Sir Clive Woodward coaching and the Celtic nations had their resources spread over many comparatively weak teams. After that though it was a different story.
Looking back in 2024, RFU head Bill Sweeney lamented “two decades of underperformance.” Likewise, England coach Steve Borthwick labelled his country the “Six Nations’ serial underachievers” although France could also lay claim to that title. Despite their superior playing numbers and finances, neither of the countries with privately controlled professional leagues have been able to match the titles won by Ireland or Wales in the past twenty years. Both of these Celtic countries have benefitted from the cohesion of having just a few top tier clubs and being able to manage the careers, workload and availability of their international players.
So although England was the most successful team at World Under 20 level in the 2010s, it has failed to translate that into similar senior success. Clubs have overworked their test stars, haven’t given players the best opportunities to further develop in their early 20s, and didn’t release their youngsters outside test windows.
THE GIANT ESCAPES THE ARMS OF MORPHEUS… BUT CAN IT ESCAPE THE BONDS OF SARACENS AND BATH?
For the past decade or so, the RFU has recognised its predicament and bought some concessions from the clubs. Initially this was largely restricted to the availability of players during and before international windows, but this year’s developments could add up to significant progress.
Under the Professional Game Agreement with the clubs, Borthwick now has control over all health related matters of his best talent; also the maximum number of games has reduced from 35 to 30. This might go some way towards reducing the player workload disadvantage, although 30 matches are still a lot more than the likes of South Africa, Ireland and New Zealand regulars tend to play.
Other progressive initiatives include a new comp for players aged 18-23, which will hopefully help Under 20s stars transition better to senior footy. And when a weakness at prop was identified, the RFU set up a “scrummaging school” which already seems to have had a big impact in the Premiership. The giant is definitely awake and is proving itself pretty inventive in those areas not controlled by private interests.
The big question though is whether all these changes are enough. The new elite players’ union Team England Rugby signed a four year deal with the RFU last month, but has “extensive concerns about the current rest provisions for England players.” They also highlighted “the specific player welfare issues faced by international players.”
It’s not just the players who are frustrated. Owen Slot recently wrote in The Times that the Professional Game Agreement reminded him of the “1995 catastrophe” which gave away so much power to the clubs in the first place. He believes that the opportunity created by the clubs’ financial weakness following COVID has been wasted, lamenting the RFU’s “£33m-a-year howler… offering English rugby little control over development of players and overseas recruitment.”
CONCLUSION
The story of English rugby has been a cycle of strict amateur values causing a long period of underperformance, which has eventually led to embarrassment and a determination to do something about it. Until that amateur ethos plays another crucial role…
The RFU has now reached the “determination” stage and has implemented enough improvements to make the giant dangerous again. However, the concern is that passivity at the dawn of professionalism has allowed private interests to tie knots that the union still hasn’t worked out how to fully unravel. When will English rugby be able to fulfill its potential again?
