There have been some rumblings here and there that Harry Kane is being singled out for Bayern Munich’s scoring droughts. Fans uttered things along the lines of “stop dropping so deep”, “stay up front near the box and be a poacher”, and “stop passing to the side and go for goal yourself.” The latter in particular would imply that Kane has support, right? Well, he does, but is that support really all there?
The wingers have been the center of criticism for a while now due to their inefficiency and the root cause of frustration for Bayern fans at the moment. Some pointed fingers at Vincent Kompany for not having a backup plan, but when Plan A in fact works well but stumbles at the final hurdle, it’s clear who is at fault here.
Let’s start by saying Kane is not faultless. First of all, his conversion rate has taken a hit — he’s not scoring shots he usually would: but that’s a fairly minor problem. Next, there are quite a few instances where Bayern has a promising chance on the break, and Kane is too far behind and too slow to make it into the box (or anywhere threatening) in time — this is what often gets the media attention.
But there are far more instances of Kane being in the box in threatening areas while the wingers fluff around and ruin the momentum…or simply make the wrong decision. Surely, the former is often visible and frustrating to watch in games. However, the latter is a bigger issue, one that concerns the quality and decision-making of Bayern’s wingers. As this piece progresses, we will also discuss why Kane dropping deep isn’t always an issue but is easy to condemn when the fruits of Kane’s chance creation are rarely ever realized. This is a long piece, but is as important as it is long. Buckle in!
Kane is in the box, the support isn’t
First, let’s run through some often-seen scenarios. Look at this instance against Feyenoord. Kane is running past the defensive line while the Feyenoord defenders close in on Kingsley Coman. A quick pass would allow an unmarked Kane an open shot.
The outcome? Coman decides to shoot and misses.
Here’s one against Barcelona. Coman with the ball in the box and Kane escaping his marker. Again, Coman shoots and misses.
Look at this instance. Kane clearly asking for the ball in a favorable position while Sané has the ball out wide. A long pass to a static Kane would clearly be the play here as the defenders run back to maintain structure.
Well, no. Sané shoots from an obscene angle and misses.
Here’s another one, this time against St. Pauli. Kane makes an open and unmarked run into the box and is in prime position to receive the ball from Sané.
Sané shoots from all the way out there and misses.
Here’s another snapshot from the same game, just minutes later. Kane is in a great position to receive the ball outside the box as defenders scramble back, and the obvious play here would be to pass the ball.
Sané shoots — you can already guess the outcome.
Another one: Konrad Laimer with the ball and Kane has an unblocked shot at goal, but the pass never comes while the ball goes over the net.
An interesting note on Laimer is how he often overlaps and functions as a proxy winger of sorts. The game against Benfica shows this well, as Olise moves further wide while Laimer takes on a more direct winger role. Regardless, the winger instinct is still missing. Here’s another instance from the same game. Kane can be seen asking for the ball with a clear header in sight, but Laimer opts to shoot rather than cross.
Yet Bayern’s ‘real’ wingers are no better and would probably make the same choice nine times out of ten. Here’s a pretty similar situation with Sané: again, Kane is clearly asking for the ball, and Sané could either pass or cross but opts to shoot.
A final example: a prime position to pass the ball to Kane, who is ready to receive it, but he never gets the pass as the ball flies over the net.
We can keep going; there are countless examples involving Thomas Müller, Joshua Kimmich, and Serge Gnabry. The wingers’ abandonment of Kane in the box is even reflected statistically. The wingers are making fewer crosses and taking more shots on their own compared to 2020/21.
Leroy Sané takes 4 shots per 90 this season — he only took 2.87 per 90 in 20/21. It is even an increase from last season when he took 2.88 per 90. The story is the same for Kingsley Coman, who takes 3.42 shots per 90 this season, but took just 2.71 per 90 in 20/21 and 2.60 per 90 last season. In fact, Sané is taking more shots than Kane himself (!) who manages just 3.81 per 90.
Even Serge Gnabry is taking marginally more shots: 3.36 per 90 compared to 3.18 in 20/21 and 3 shots per 90 last season. Yet, far less clinical than he was last season despite taking more shots: falling from 0.24 goals per shot to 0.08 (down by 3x!) this season.
Sané completes 2.96 crosses per 90 this season, compared to 3.28 in 20/21 and 3.12 last season. Coman is worse off in this aspect, managing 3.59 crosses per 90, a significant drop from 4.86 in 20/21 and 4.80 last season. Gnabry? 2.74 per 90 compared to 3.41 in 20/21.
In 2020/21, Lewandowski received 28.7 passes and 6.88 progressive passes per 90. Since Kane joined Bayern, he has received an average of 25.3 passes and barely 5 progressive passes per 90. One could argue the reason for this is Kane dropping deep, but that would mean he would receive more passes because he’s in a better position for hold-up play. We’ve seen that Kane can get into the right attacking spaces, but these statistics just further prove how he is often left abandoned by the rest of the attack: due to terrible decision-making in the final third.
This is just to further the point made by the in-game images: Harry Kane does not get the support he needs. He is getting less support than he did last season and far less than Robert Lewandowski did, so it is outright wrong and unfair to critique Kane for “not going up front” when he is very much present in the box more often than he gets credit for.
Well, why is this happening? Why isn’t Kane getting the ball? There is nuance to the explanation. The obvious answer is that the wingers seem to overestimate their own quality and abilities. They have abysmal decision-making. They are far from their best selves and are simply incapable of playing for any top European club, let alone a team like Bayern who place the heaviest of emphasis on winning.
The other reason underpins the first, is the shift from 2020/21 to today. The wingers used to play a largely supportive role: their job was to get the ball to Lewandowski. They would create chances and to the most extent, did that well. That is no longer the case. The wingers no longer care about getting the ball to the striker — instead, they have become (or at least they seem to think that they are) the ‘scorers’, the final man.
This is less of a tactical issue because if it were tactical, we would notice the wingers getting into clear scoring positions or making striker-esque runs — but they are not. They are getting into and occupying the same positions that they did in 2020/21 and earlier — but instead of crossing, cutting back, or passing the ball, they seem to shoot or pass it back (the ‘fluff’ we discussed earlier). This is down to player evolution gone wrong. Vincent Kompany’s system works in getting the wingers into prime places to create chances for Kane, but they simply don’t — because they have become accustomed to playing as the final man. What results is a group of wingers who are inadequate creators or scorers, unable to decide when it is apt to pass or shoot: prompting the conundrum Bayern finds themselves in.
Look at what happens when the wingers (albeit rarely) do it right — Coman pulled off a tough cross allowing Kane to head it in and put Bayern 2-0 up against Holstein Kiel this weekend. As a matter of fact, Michael Olise has impeccable decision-making that has been sorely missed at Bayern for years. His ability to discern whether to shoot or cross and his success rate following that decision is incredibly high, and he actively looks for Kane in the box. As such, he probably has the highest pass rate to Kane in the box.
Well, that explains Kane not scoring at a level he usually does. But surely the criticism against him for ‘dropping deep and achieving nothing’ still stands? No, not really. The reason people say Kane’s playing a deeper role achieves nothing is because the chances he creates are wasted by those he creates them for, namely the wingers. In fact, Kompany tries to counteract the wingers’ lack of chance creation by using Kane in a deeper role to create chances (which Kane does far better than most of the attack — more on this later).
Kane dropping deep is a net positive for Bayern.
Look at this, where Kane’s presence in a deeper position allows him to win the ball back from a goal-kick. He is occupying the space often left unoccupied, between the midfield pivot and the attacking midfielder. As such, he can quickly create a chance for Musiala who is already rushing forward, with a clear path ahead of him.
Here’s another instance: Kane deliberately moves away from the goal, opening up space, and allowing Raphaël Guerreiro to move forward and pass back to Kane.
Kane then waits and completes an almost perfect pass to an advanced Guerreiro on the run, who collects with composure and scores.
Kane is far from the box here, behind the wingers. He receives the ball and quickly starts a promising attack creating a chance for Coman on the break. But Coman squanders.
And finally, against PSG. He executed a brilliant curved pass to Sané, who shot too early and missed.
Again, these examples barely scratch the surface. Kane not being in the box allows him to create these chances by dropping into places that no one else is in, giving him space to work with and an advantage when winning back the ball. Kane averages 0.27 interceptions per 90, compared to his 0.16 last season. Kane has always dropped deep, but Kompany gets him to enter the right areas of the pitch to become a primary chance creator alongside being a primary goalscorer.
This is in contrast to Thomas Tuchel, who emphasized having someone to fill in the spaces Kane left, opting for transitions in attack (see the Müller Paradox from last season). This change is seen statistically — he averages 3.59 shot-creating actions per 90, compared to his 2.61 last season. The reason we don’t ‘see’ his impact is because the rest of the attack simply can’t finish the chances.
When you see a Bayern chance with Kane nowhere near the box, that chance was probably created by Kane himself.
Why use Kane as a creator? Well, because he’s bloody good at it. A good example: Florian Wirtz averages 0.91 goal-creating actions per 90. Kane is almost as good with 0.81 — while being a goalscorer too.
Chance creation varies across teams. Some teams use a clear system during build-up that involves a competent midfield and wings, giving birth to chance-creating mechanisms. Bayern is forced to over-rely on players rather than a system and needs Jamal Musiala, Alphonso Davies (notably this season!), Michael Olise, and Joshua Kimmich to create chances, but Kane is the only other Bayern forward to put up decent chance creation numbers in both the league and the UCL: the wingers are nowhere to be seen. Kane serves as the link between buildup and attack when he drops deep, and that is a key role in Kompany’s system that he is uniquely suited to playing.
Contrary to popular belief, this really isn’t taking away from his scoring ability either: while he is taking fewer shots and has been more wasteful recently, he’s still scoring 1.03 goals per 90, compared to his 1.02 last season.
Conclusion
Kane, Bayern’s best finisher, lacks support from the rest of his attack because they don’t create chances. Kompany counters this by using Kane to create chances for the same attack that cannot finish them. Yet Kane alone bears the blame for the wingers’ inadequacy in providing for Kane or converting Kane’s chances. These same players supported Lewandowski adequately, so why couldn’t they do the same for Kane?
So, the next time you say Bayern needs a poacher that stays in the box, maybe consider that Bayern needs a new set of wingers that can adequately support Kane first.
All stats are taken from FBref and are accurate as of Bayern Munich’s 3-1 victory over Slovan Bratislava. The stats include Champions League and Bundesliga games only.
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